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Abstract
We study the cake-cutting problem where agents have single-peaked prefer-
ences over the cake. We show that a recently proposed mechanism by Wang
and Wu (2019) to obtain envy-free allocations can yield large welfare losses.
Using a simplifying assumption, we characterize all Pareto optimal alloca-
tions, which have a simple structure: are peak-preserving and non-wasteful.
Finally, we provide simple alternative mechanisms that Pareto dominate that
of Wang–Wu and achieve envy-freeness or Pareto optimality.
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1. Introduction
The problem of how to fairly divide a heterogeneous good among n agents
is one of the oldest problems in fair division (Steinhaus, 1948). Known as
cake-cutting, this problem has spanned a long interdisciplinary literature in
economics, computer science, mathematics and political science that includes
multiple real-life applications, such as the division of land, inheritances, and
computing resources.
One of the main goals of the cake-cutting literature is the construction
of division methods that produce envy-free allocations. Such methods exist,
but they require a large amount of information regarding agents’ prefer-
ences (Brams and Taylor, 1995; Aziz and Mackenzie, 2016). However, when
agents’ preferences are well-behaved, an envy-free allocation can be com-
puted with few queries about agents’ preferences. In particular, when agents
have single-peaked preferences, an envy-free allocation can be achieved with
only 2n queries, using a clever procedure recently proposed by Wang and
Wu (2019).1 Single-peaked preferences are particularly interesting to study
for two reasons. First, they can be described concisely: agents are specified
as peak points, who prefer the pieces of cake that are close to their own
locations. Second, single-peaked preferences can realistically describe prefer-
ences over land resources, clean water and mineral deposits; and have been
thoroughly studied in other fair division problems.2
Although the Wang–Wu procedure achieves envy-freeness with low in-
formational requirements, it may produce allocations that are Pareto domi-
nated. In this note, we show that the Wang–Wu procedure may waste up to,
but not more than, n−1
n
of the total achievable utility (Proposition 1). Obtain-
ing a Pareto optimal allocation is easy only when single-peaked preferences
have a common slope; in this case they have a simple structure and are com-
pletely characterized by being peak-preserving and non-wasteful (Proposition
2). Under those assumptions, we can construct two simple mechanisms that
Pareto dominate the Wang–Wu mechanism, while attaining envy-freeness or
Pareto optimality. Alternatively, the utilitarian mechanism that returns the
allocation that maximizes the sum of agents’ utilities is another reasonable
option that is efficient and also easy to describe (Proposition 3, Table 1).
1In the more general class of piecewise linear preferences, an envy-free allocation can be
computed using Ω(n6) queries (Kurokawa et al., 2013). A connected envy-free allocation
cannot be obtained by a mechanism with finite queries (Stromquist, 2008).
2E.g. Moulin (1984); Sprumont (1991); Ehlers et al. (2002); Kasajima (2013); Long
(2019), among others. Single-peaked preferences have also been (implicitly) used in cake-
cutting (Weller, 1985, p. 17).
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2. Model
We consider the standard cake-cutting problem (Nicolo` and Yu, 2008;
Procaccia, 2016). The cake is the [0, 1] interval and the set of agents is
N = {1, ..., n}. A piece of cake P is a finite set of disjoint subintervals of [0, 1].
Each agent i ∈ N has a integrable, non-negative value density function vi.
For each piece of cake P , an agents value or utility on P is denoted by Vi(P )
and defined by the integral of its density function, i.e., Vi(P ) :=
∫
P
vi(x)dx.
Thus, Vi : 2
[0,1] → R+ is called the valuation or utility function of agent i.
The definition of the valuation function implies that it is additive and non-
atomic. We simplify notation by writing Vi(x, y) instead of Vi([x, y]) for each
interval [x, y]. We normalize agents valuations so that Vi(0, 1) = 1 for each
i ∈ N . A cake-cutting problem is a triple ([0, 1], N, (vi)i∈N).
We assume that agents’ preferences over the cake are single-peaked. Agent
i has a single-peaked valuation when her value density function vi satisfies
that there is a number pi ∈ [0, 1] such that vi(pi) = maxx∈[0,1] vi(x) and
vi(x) = max{0, vi(pi) − ki |x− pi|} for all x ∈ [0, 1] and some coefficient
ki > 0. We call pi and vi(pi) the peak location and peak density of agent i,
respectively. Notice that the coefficient ki as well as the density function is
uniquely determined by the peak location and peak density as the normal-
ized assumption says
∫ 1
0
vi(x)dx = 1. We use the notation Ui to denote the
maximum subinterval such that agent i has positive value on every point,
i.e. vi(x) > 0 for all x ∈ Ui and vi(x) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1] \ Ui. The points li
and ri denote the left and right endpoints of Ui. We assume without loss of
generality that
⋃
i∈N Ui = [0, 1].
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An allocation X = (X1, ..., Xn) is a partition of the cake among the n
agents, i.e. each agent i receives the piece of cake Xi, the pieces are disjoint,
and
⋃
i∈N Xi = [0, 1]. An allocation X is proportional if Vi(Xi) ≥ 1/n for
all i ∈ N, and envy-free (EF) if Vi(Xi) ≥ Vi(Xj) for all i, j ∈ N . Envy-
freeness implies proportionality, and they are equivalent for n = 2. None
of these fairness properties, however, imply efficiency in the sense of Pareto
optimality. An allocation X is Pareto optimal (PO) if there is no other
allocation X ′ that Pareto dominates it, i.e. such that, for all i ∈ N , Vi(X
′
i) ≥
Vi(Xi); and for some i, Vi(X
′
i) > Vi(Xi).
A mechanism M is a function mapping a series of queries to agents about
their valuations into an allocation. In the standard Robertson and Webb
(1998) framework, in which we focus, only two types of queries are allowed:
either an agent is asked to cut the cake at an specific point so that the left
3Pieces of cake that are not desired by anybody can be dropped or assigned arbitrarily,
and play no role with regards to fairness and efficiency considerations.
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piece has a specific valuation, or an agent is asked to evaluate a piece of cake,
i.e. reveal her valuation for such a piece. Mechanism M is said to be envy-
free (resp. proportional, Pareto optimal) if it always produces an envy-free
(resp. proportional, Pareto optimal) allocation.
3. Results
Wang and Wu (2019) provide an ingenious mechanism to obtain envy-
free allocations with only 2n queries. Their mechanism asks two cut queries
to each agent (in the standard Robertson–Webb model) to find the li, pi, ri
points (see their Algorithm 1). Then, all those points are ordered in increas-
ing sequence, together with the 0 and 1 endpoints. Between any two of these
points, the cake is divided into 2n equidistant pieces, and agent 1 receives
pieces 1 and 2n, agent 2 receives pieces 2 and 2n− 1, and so on until agent
n, who receives pieces n and n + 1 (see Figure 1 for an example). Because
valuations are single-peaked, their procedure computes an envy-free alloca-
tion with only 2n queries (i.e. substantially less queries than those required
in more general preference domains, see Kurokawa et al. (2013)).
However, a problem with the Wang–Wumechanism is that it may produce
an allocation that is not Pareto optimal, as they point out. In fact, the Wang–
Wu procedure only produces a Pareto optimal allocation in a very special
case: when pi = pj and ki = kj for all i, j ∈ N .
Moreover, the welfare losses than can occur in the Wang–Wu mechanism
can be substantially large, as the example in Figure 1 shows. In our example,
the Wang–Wu procedure gives to each agent only 1/n of the utility that they
obtain in the unique PO allocation. The example can be extended to any
number of agents to show the severity of the welfare losses in the Wang–Wu
procedure vis-a-vis Pareto optimal allocations. To formalise this observation,
let X PO be the set of all PO allocations and XWW be the allocation suggested
by the Wang–Wu procedure. Let T PO := min
X∈XPO
∑
i∈N V (Xi)
n
and TWW :=
∑
i∈N
V (XWW
i
)
n
.4 The welfare losses in the Wang–Wu mechanism are defined
as WL := T PO − TWW . Our first Proposition provides a tight upper bound
for WL.
4The choice of the Pareto optimal allocation with the minimum sum of utilities is
arbitrary. Because in the proof we construct a cake-cutting problem with a unique Pareto
optimal allocation, our result can be rephrased using TPO := max
X∈XPO
∑
i∈N V (Xi)
n
. Our
definition of welfare losses is related to the price of fairness (Bertsimas et al., 2011).
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xvi(x)
p1 p2 p3 1
(a) Single-peaked preferences of three agents over the cake.
(b) Unique Pareto-optimal allocation. (c) Wang-Wu allocation
Figure 1: Agents 1, 2, and 3 receive the grey, white, and black pieces respectively. In the
unique PO allocation (which is also EF), the sum of individual valuations is 3, whereas in
the Wang–Wu allocation, the sum is only 1.
Proposition 1. For any n, the welfare losses in the Wang–Wu mechanism
WL can be up to, but no more than, n−1
n
.
Proof. To show that the upper bound of n−1
n
is achievable, construct a cake-
cutting problem such that
⋂
i∈N Ui = ∅. Then, there is a unique Pareto
optimal allocation XPO such that Vi(X
PO
i ) = 1 for all i ∈ N . In contrast, in
the Wang–Wu procedure [li, pi] is divided into 2n equidistant pieces, of which
agent i receives 2 that she jointly values at 1/2n; similarly she receives 2 of
the 2n equidistant pieces in which the interval [pi, ri] is divided, which she
also jointly values at 1/2n. Thus, Vi(X
WW
i ) = 1/n for all i ∈ N , and thus
T PO − TWW = n−1
n
.
To show that this upper bound is tight, note that theWang–Wu procedure
is envy-free, and thus proportional, so that Vi(X
WW
i ) ≥ 1/n, and thus, for
any cake-cutting problem, T PO − TWW ≤ n−1
n
.
The trade-off between efficiency and envy-freeness is not specific to the
Wang–Wu procedure, and is present in several fair division problems (e.g.
Maniquet and Sprumont, 2000), including cake-cutting.5 To understand this
5Large welfare losses also arise in matching problems (Ortega, 2018, 2019).
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trade-off better, we provide a characterization of all Pareto-optimal mecha-
nisms. This is substantially easier to do when all valuation density functions
vi have the same slope, i.e. ki = k for all i ∈ N , an assumption that we im-
pose from now.6 We focus on the generic case in which all peaks are different,
i.e. pi 6= pj for all i, j ∈ N .
7
An allocation X is non-wasteful if Xi ⊆ Ui for all i. A connected allo-
cation is completely described by n − 1 cutting points c1 ≤ . . . ≤ cn−1 such
that X1 = [0, c1], X2 = (c1, c2], and so on. A connected allocation is peak-
preserving if the interval [0, c1] is allocated to the agent with the smallest
peak point, (c1, c2] is allocated to the agent with the second smallest peak
point, and so on, until the piece (cn−1, 1] is allocated to the agent with the
largest peak point. In our second Proposition, we show that non-wastefulness
and peak-preservingness completely characterize Pareto optimal allocations,
which implies that all Pareto optimal allocations are connected.
Proposition 2. When ki = k for all i ∈ N , an allocation is Pareto optimal
if and only if it is a non-wasteful and peak-preserving allocation.
Proof. First, we show (by contradiction) that if X is Pareto optimal, then it
must be non-wasteful and peak preserving. If X was wasteful, some agent
i would receive a part of the cake that she does not value, but which by
assumption is valued by someone else. A clear Pareto improvement exists,
and thus X is not Pareto optimal, a contradiction.
If X was not peak-preserving, it means it is either not connected or it is
connected but it does not respect peaks. In both cases, there must exist two
agents i, j such that pi < pj , [a, b] ⊆ Xj and (b, c] ⊆ Xi, where a < b < b
′ < c
(see subfigure 2.a).8 We show geometrically in Figure 2 that a reassignment
of the interval [a, c] such that i receives [a, b′) and j receives [b′, c] leads to a
Pareto improvement, where b′ is chosen so that Vj(b
′, c) = Vj(a, b).
9
6One may consider the following broader preference domain: if li ≤ lj, then ri ≤ rj for
all i, j ∈ N . Our results do not extend to this more general preference domain.
7Our results extend to the case when some agents have the same peaks mutatis mu-
tandis. In such a case, an allocation may be disconnected only between agents who have
the same peaks.
8That agents i, j as above must exist is trivial when X does not respect peaks. If X
is not connected, there is an agent α who obtains at least two disconnected pieces of cake
[α0, α′] and (α′′, α′′′], and agents β and γ with allocations (α′, β′] and (γ′, α′′], such that
α′ < β′ ≤ γ′ < α′′. If pα > pβ, then i = β and j = α. Otherwise, if pα < pβ and pα < pγ ,
then i = α and j = γ. And if pα < pβ and pα > pγ , then i = γ and j = β.
9A similar argument is used to show that, when two agents divide several objects, at
most one object is divided in all Pareto optimal allocations (Moulin, 2004, p. 255). See
also Corollary 2.4 in Sandomirskiy and Segal-Halevi (2019).
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(a) A non peak-preserving allocation.
pi pj
a b′ c
1
2
5
6
7
8
(b) A Pareto improvement.
Figure 2: In subfigure 2.a, we have a non peak-preserving allocation in which agent j gets
[a, b] and agent i gets (b, c] (the sum of utilities is the shaded area). In subfigure 2.b,
we show how such allocation is Pareto dominated by a peak-preserving allocation. We
reassign the interval [a, c] so that j gets an interval (b′, c] such that Vj(b
′, c) = Vj(a, b). The
difference Vi(a, b
′)+Vj(b
′, c)−Vj(a, b)−Vi(b, c) is equal to the area of polygon 1−2−6−5
(coordinates (a, vj(a))− (a, vi(a))− (b′, vi(b′))− (b′, vj(b′))) minus the area of the polygon
3−4−8−7 (coordinates (b, vj(b))−(b, vi(b))−(c, vi(c))−(c, vj(c))). The former is strictly
larger than the latter because b′ > b, due to the fact that c ≤ pj. Since by construction
Vj(b
′, c) = Vj(a, b), we must have that Vi(a, b
′) > Vi(b, c), showing that the allocation in
subfigure 2.a is Pareto dominated. The argument is completely symmetrical when the
allocation endpoints a, b, c are located elsewhere.
Second, we prove that if X is non-wasteful and peak-preserving, then it
must be Pareto optimal. By contradiction, suppose X is Pareto dominated
by an alternative allocation X ′ so that for some agent i, Vi(X
′
i) > Vi(Xi) and
Vj(X
′
j) ≥ Vj(Xj) for all j ∈ N . X
′ can be assumed to be Pareto optimal,
otherwise there exists another allocation X ′′ that Pareto dominates both X ′
and X (we can reach the Pareto optimal allocation by trading among agents).
So let X ′ be Pareto optimal, which by our previous argument must be non-
wasteful and peak preserving. BothX andX ′ can be completely described by
a sequence of n−1 cut points, called c = (c1, . . . , cn−1) and c
′ = (c′1, . . . , c
′
n−1),
with endpoint cn = c
′
n = 1. Let s be the smallest index for which c
′
s < cs, if
such exists. Then, because X is non-wasteful, Vs(Xs) > Vs(X
′
s), and thus X
′
does not Pareto dominate X . If no such index exist, Vn(Xn) > Vn(X
′
n), and
thus X ′ does not Pareto dominate X . We conclude that X must be Pareto
optimal.
The assumption of common slopes is critical to obtain such a simple
characterization of Pareto optimality: when each agent’s valuation density
has a different slope, Pareto optimal allocations may be disconnected, as
Figure 3 shows.
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pi pj
(a) A cake-cutting problem.
pi pj
(b) A disconnected Pareto optimal
allocation.
Figure 3: An cake-cutting problem with single-peaked valuations and different slopes. The
allocation in which agent i obtains the grey parts, and agent j obtains the black parts is
Pareto optimal, but not connected.
4. Three different mechanisms that improve on Wang–Wu
We turn to the design of a mechanism that returns an allocation that
is both Pareto optimal and envy-free. Although such an allocation exists
(Weller, 1985), constructing an algorithm that returns it (in the Robertson–
Webb model) remains an open question when preferences are single-peaked
(and is impossible in more general preference domains (Kurokawa et al.,
2013)). Nevertheless, we provide three deterministic mechanisms that achieve
both properties individually knowing only agents’ peaks and endpoints, and
that, at the same time, improve on the original Wang–Wu procedure by
either Pareto dominating it or generating a higher total utility. We note that
the three mechanisms we describe below are in the Robertson–Webb model,
since the peak and endpoints of valuations’ densities can be recovered using
Algorithm 1 in Wang and Wu (2019). Figure 4 exemplifies how our three
different solutions differ and improve on the Wang–Wu mechanism.
1. Utilitarian Mechanism (UM). Our first mechanism computes the alloca-
tion that maximizes the sum of agents’ utilities, i.e. the area under the
upper envelope of the valuation density functions. Computing such alloca-
tion is easy: it is the peak-preserving allocation described by n−1 cut points
cu1 , . . . , c
u
n−1, each located at the intersection of the valuation density func-
tions, i.e. cui is such that vi(c
u
i ) = vi+1(c
u
i+1). The utilitarian mechanism is
Pareto optimal (and arguably the best one among all Pareto optimal ones,
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since it maximizes the sum of utilities), but it may create envy.10
2. Leftmost leaves (LL). Our second mechanism is leftmost leaves and is also
simple. Index agents according to their peaks, so that agents 1 is the one
with the smallest peak, and let cll1 be the point for which V1[0, c
ll
1 ] = 1/n
and c′ll1 = max{c
ll
1 , l2}. Agent 1 is assigned the interval [0, c
′ll
1 ]. Then, let c
ll
2
be the point such that V2[c
′ll
1 , c
ll
2 ] =
V2[c′ll1 ,1]
n−1
and c′ll2 = max{c
ll
2 , l3}. Agent 2
is assigned the interval (c′ll1 , c
′ll
2 ] and so on, until the last agent who receives
the interval (c′lln−1, 1]. Leftmost leaves generates a Pareto optimal allocation,
guaranteeing all agents at least a utility of 1/n (Kyropoulou et al., 2019;
Ortega and Segal-Halevi, 2019), in contrast with the Wang–Wu mechanism
which guarantees exactly a 1/n utility to all agents; thus leftmost leaves
Pareto dominates the Wang–Wu mechanism. However, leftmost leaves can
generate envy.
3. Modified Wang–Wu (MWW). The third mechanism is a modification of
the original Wang–Wu mechanism. As in the original version, the three
points li, pi, ri for all agents are ordered in increasing sequence, together with
the 0 and 1 endpoints. The cake is cut at each of these points, generating up
to 3n+1 cake pieces. The difference with the original Wang–Wu procedure is
that each of these pieces is divided only among the agents who have a positive
value for it. Formally, for each cake piece Pi let ni := {i ∈ N : Ui
⋂
Pi 6=
∅}. Then, each piece Pi is divided into 2ni equidistant pieces, which are
shared into the interested ni agents as in the Wang–Wu procedure: the first
interested agent gets pieces 1 and 2ni, the second one gets pieces 2 and 2n−1
and so on. This procedure is envy-free (like the original Wang–Wu procedure,
which it Pareto dominates), although is not Pareto optimal since it generates
a disconnected allocation.
We summarize our findings in our third Proposition and in Table 1.
Proposition 3. The utilitarian mechanism is Pareto optimal and maximizes
the sum of agents’ utilities. Leftmost leaves is Pareto optimal and Pareto
dominates the original Wang–Wu mechanism. MWW is envy-free and also
Pareto dominates the original Wang–Wu mechanism.
Proof. Proposition 2 implies that the utilitarian and leftmost leaves mecha-
nisms are Pareto optimal. MWW is envy-free because, for any of the (up to)
10The utilitarian mechanism maximizes the sum of utilities, but maximizing other ag-
gregate utility functions may also be of interest, such as the Nash product (Segal-Halevi
and Sziklai, 2019). See Juarez and Kumar (2013) for further applications of the utilitarian
mechanism.
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(a) The cake-cutting problem.
(b) Wang–Wu (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ).
(c) Leftmost leaves
(13 ,
19
40 ,
77
100).
(d) Utilitarian
(2332 ,
14
32 ,
23
32).
(e) MWW (2348 ,
18
48 ,
23
48 ).
Figure 4: An example showing the differences between the four different mechanisms.
Agents 1, 2, and 3 receive the grey, white, and black pieces respectively. Agents’ utilities
appear in parentheses.
Table 1: Summary of the properties of each mechanism.
Efficient Envy-free Max Utility Dominates WW
Wang–Wu No Yes No
Utilitarian Yes No Yes No
LL Yes No No Yes
MWW No Yes No Yes
3n+ 1 subintervals generated, any agent values the share received by of any
other agent (among those who also receive a share) as much as her own (as
in Theorem 2 in Wang and Wu (2019)). Leftmost leaves Pareto dominates
Wang–Wu follows because leftmost leaves is proportional, and only assigns
a utility of 1/n to every agent when all agents’ have the same preferences
(Kyropoulou et al., 2019), whereas Wang–Wu always gives a utility of 1/n to
all agents. That MWW Pareto dominates Wang–Wu follows from the fact
that, although both WW and MWW divide the cake into the same number
of pieces (3n + 1), MWW only assigns to agents cake shares of the pieces
they desire.
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5. Conclusion
Dividing a cake fairly and efficiently is a difficult problem, even when
agents have simple preferences. Nevertheless, we have proposed fair division
mechanisms that are either Pareto optimal or envy-free, and which Pareto
dominate the allocation generated by the envy-free procedure of Wang–Wu.
Using any of these mechanisms instead is justified due to the large utility
losses that the Wang–Wu mechanism can generate.
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